This article investigates the conditions which make it costly for governments to renege on institutional commitments governing monetary policy. Focusing on one such type of commitment -monetary integration -we develop and test a hypothesis which suggests that the presence of parallel international agreements plays an important role in raising the costs of exit for states which might otherwise withdraw from a monetary union. While existing political economy work on credible commitments in the area of monetary policy has had a heavy focus on countries in the European Union, we broaden the inquiry, using quantitative and qualitative evidence from the numerous African countries which have participated in monetary unions over the last forty years. Our results provide strong support for the parallel agreements hypothesis.
conclusion with regard to central bank independence, given that central bank laws in many countries can and have been changed regularly, or simply ignored. In this article we ask what factors can raise the cost of reneging on a monetary commitment for governments which are experiencing political pressure to do so. Our empirical tests consider the example of participation in international monetary agreements, making use of a natural experiment provided by the experience of twenty-nine African countries over the period 1960-94. Our choice of cases is motivated by the availability of this data and by the fact that the hypothesis we seek to test is most frequently applied to the case of monetary integration.
At independence (circa 1960), twenty-nine African countries participated in one of six regional currency unions, each of which was characterized by (1) a fixed exchange rate peg to a third country with full convertibility (France or Great Britain), (2) a common currency shared between African states, and (3) strict limits on central bank lending to government. These unions and the rule-based monetary policy they entailed had the potential to serve as a mechanism for states not to engage in surprise inflationary expansions and not to run excessive fiscal deficits, to the extent that deficits were financed through money creation.
While the countries which initially participated in these African unions shared a number of common characteristics in terms of economic and political structure, subsequently there has been substantial variation from country to country in terms of participation and respect for monetary rules. This provides us with a natural experiment for asking when and why international monetary agreements are more effective as sources of credible commitment. Within our sample of twenty-nine countries there has also been significant variation in outcomes both within the group of former French colonies and within the group of former British colonies, suggesting that much of the observed variation in outcomes cannot be explained by the different strategies adopted by France and Great Britain towards their ex-colonies. We consider both cross-country statistical evidence and more detailed qualitative evidence from two unions: the CFA Franc Zone and the East African Currency Board. 3 We develop and evaluate a hypothesis suggesting that costs of reneging on an institutional commitment are higher when a government risks suffering losses in parallel areas of policy. While our empirical analysis concerns international agreements, the hypothesis we develop is also relevant to the sustainability of strictly domestic monetary commitments, like an exchange rate peg. Micro-foundations for these claims can be derived from the industrial organization literature on collusion among oligopolists. 4 In the case of international agreements, fear of losing the benefits from parallel agreements in the areas of trade, aid or security can dissuade even a government with strong preferences for looser monetary policy from exiting. A high cost of exit can in turn allow a government to commit credibly, but only under conditions where other member states would clearly oppose attempts to break monetary rules (such as limits on central bank funding of governments). A number of scholars writing on monetary integration in Europe have emphasized the importance of parallel agreements, but little effort has been made to see if empirical support for this argument can be found beyond this single case. 5 We find strong support for our hypothesis based on both quantitative and qualitative evidence. A logit estimation of the likelihood of exit from a currency union by an African government shows that the existence of parallel agreements in the areas of trade, aid or security is associated with lower predicted probabilities of exit than would otherwise prevail. Qualitative evidence from archival and other sources provides further support for our hypothesis and allows us to evaluate several of the observable implications of our argument which would be difficult to test statistically. For states which participated in currency unions, there is strong evidence that governments which would have preferred to adopt a separate currency in order to enjoy short-term gains from money creation were dissuaded from doing so by the fear of losing benefits from parallel agreements. In contrast, in each case of exit from a currency union, there is evidence that governments reneged only when they had a preference for severing both their monetary agreements and their parallel agreements. Finally, evidence from the Franc Zone demonstrates that continued participation in a monetary union does not necessarily imply credibility of monetary policy, as this latter feature depends on the presence of governments which will place sanctions on states that break the rules of a union.
The remainder of the article is as follows. A review of the credibility problems in monetary policy follows discussing work on the determinants of policy credibility and developing the parallel agreements hypothesis, which is evaluated, as is the method which is used to evaluate it. Next, the summary evidence on participation in African currency unions is presented and a simple statistical test of our hypothesis as well as that of the alternatives is offered.
Evaluation of our hypothesis with historical evidence from Franc Zone and East African Currency Board states follows before the concluding section.
I N S T I T U T I O N S A N D T H E C R E D I B I L I T Y O F M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y
In this section we first review different credibility problems in monetary policy, followed by a presentation of proposed solutions. These include the possibility that reputational effects might dissuade governments from pursuing opportunistic monetary policies. But many authors suggest that reputation alone is insufficient to establish credibility for monetary policies, and thus credibility, they argue, can only be ensured through institutional restraints on policy. These institutional restraints can include delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank, pegging the exchange rate with full capital mobility, or joining an international monetary agreement which restricts the discretion of individual states. We argue, however, that the effectiveness of these institutional solutions is often assumed rather than demonstrated, especially to the extent that real-world governments retain the authority to withdraw independence from central banks, to devalue exchange rate pegs and to secede from international monetary agreements. We conclude the section by showing how the presence of parallel agreements can raise costs of dismantling these institutions.
Credibility Problems in Monetary Policy
Credibility problems in monetary policy take several different forms. Timeinconsistency problems involve incentives for governments to engineer 'surprise' monetary expansions in order to create a temporary boost in employment or seignorage revenues once private sector actors have formed their inflation expectations.
6 Anticipating this incentive, private sector actors will revise their inflation expectations upwards, and in equilibrium, the government will be worse off than if it could somehow commit to pursuing a given policy, even after expectations have been formed.
Credibility problems can also be generated by political uncertainty, the lack of knowledge about the identity and preferences of future governments. This political uncertainty can lead to partisan political business cycles.
7 It can also prompt a current government to adopt sub-optimal macroeconomic policies. 8 Lacking any other means to influence the decisions of a successor, a government may resort to sub-optimal strategies such as failing to reform a country's tax system in order to avoid bequeathing increased revenue generating capacity to its successor. The result in equilibrium will be continued reliance on excessive seignorage financing and higher inflation (Alex Cukierman, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini, 'Seignorage and Political Instability', American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 537-55).
In these cases as well, Pareto-improving outcomes could be achieved if it was possible to somehow commit governments to a specific policy course in future periods.
Reputational Solutions to Credibility Problems
Establishing a reputation for sound policy is one potential solution to credibility problems, but in the repeated game models upon which this argument is based, a reputational equilibrium (where governments refrain from opportunism because of the long-term costs it would entail), is but one of many possible outcomes.
9 This makes it difficult to predict when the force of reputation will matter, although it is known that in order for reputation to matter, governments must not discount the future too heavily. One factor likely to lead governments to discount the future is political instability. In countries where there is a history of frequent and perhaps violent changes in government, rulers will more heavily discount the future costs of current opportunism in monetary policy. This provides a testable implication which we consider in our statistical tests.
Institutional Solutions to Credibility Problems
One institutional mechanism for a government to enhance the credibility of monetary policy is to delegate to an independent central bank which places a greater weight than society at large on the goal of price stability, as opposed to stabilization of output.
10 In Rogoff's seminal model of central bank independence, however, the implicit assumption is that governments cannot reverse decisions to delegate. This is a simplification adopted for tractability in modelling, but it leaves open the question whether it is always costly to withdraw independence from a central bank. Walsh has proposed a different solution to the credibility problem in monetary policy: give an independent central banker a contract whereby she pays a linear penalty for inflation above a certain target.
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The result would be to address the time-consistency problem without the increased variability in output entailed by Rogoff's solution. However, Walsh's model suffers from the same weakness in that it assumes that, once written, a contract is respected by all parties concerned.
In sum, if one is to provide a convincing account of why central bank independence solves credibility problems, one needs to suggest when and why central bank independence is costly to reverse, and more specifically when it is more costly to reverse than it would be for a government to renege on a more ordinary policy pledge. Progress towards this goal has been achieved by recent work which predicts that delegation of monetary policy will be more credible in systems with multiple veto players. 12 In cases where a greater number of veto players must be in agreement to renege on a decision to delegate than would be required to change underlying policies, then delegation can improve credibility. However, this leaves open the question how governments which lack multiple veto players in government might establish credibility.
Exchange rate pegs with full convertibility have also been proposed as a rule-based credibility enhancing device. It is well known that as long as a government maintains such a peg it will have no independent control over monetary policy. This imposes clear costs in that monetary policy can no longer be used for stabilization purposes, but it will bring benefits to the extent that discretionary monetary policy would otherwise be used opportunistically. One reason why an exchange rate peg might prove effective is that reneging on this institutional commitment results in a greater loss of reputation than would be suffered if a decision maker reneged on a more simple pledge, say to maintain a specific rate of inflation. 13 Cukierman, Kiguel and Liviatan have formalized this argument, but the reasons why reputational costs of defecting on an institutional commitment are increased is assumed rather than explained in their model. 14 Bordo and Rockoff have provided direct evidence of reputational costs of reneging on exchange rate rules, as governments which frequently suspended participation in the classical gold standard were obliged to pay higher risk premia on their bonds. What they do not do, however, is show that governments which reneged on the gold standard suffered a greater subsequent increase in risk premia than did governments which never joined the gold standard and which reneged on more simple policy pledges. 15 This evidence would seem crucial to support their argument.
A third institutional mechanism for a government to establish commitment in monetary policy is to join an international monetary agreement and thereby 12 (2000) . 13 The result is that there are still multiple potential equilibria, but it would be possible to expand the range of discount factors for which a reputational equilibrium can be obtained. 14 abandon the possibility to pursue an independent monetary policy. 16 This could involve multilateral pegging arrangements, such as the former European Monetary System had, where decisions to realign exchange rates needed to be made collectively. It could also involve joining a monetary union, provided of course that, in the aggregate, union members and the union central bank do not act opportunistically.
There is a major implicit assumption in arguments about the hand-tying effect of international monetary agreements, however, in that individual states always retain the right to exit. In order for international monetary agreements to improve credibility, then, as for independent central banks and exchange rate pegs, a reversal of the institutional decision to join a union must be costly. For countries which are participants in a currency union, these costs might involve the likelihood that a newly established currency can be subject to speculative attacks, but such costs would not be a deterrent to a country which was willing to let its currency float or to make it inconvertible.
Parallel Issues and the Costs of Institutional Change
A more important factor in raising the cost of institutional change may be the threat that defecting in one area of policy (like money) will lead to losses for a government in other areas. This argument can apply to institutions like central banks or exchange rate pegs, to the extent that reneging on these commitments results not only in the public reverting to higher inflation expectations, but also in sanctions for the government in other issue areas. However, the most frequent use of the parallel issues argument has been made with regard to participation in international monetary agreements, because the existence of parallel issues fundamentally alters inter-state bargaining. As such, in the discussion here and in the empirical analysis to follow we will restrict ourselves to asking how losses in parallel issue areas might influence a government's decision whether to exit from a monetary union.
Governments which enter into monetary agreements often have agreements with other member states in the domains of trade, finance, aid or security. Continuation of these other forms of co-operation may be linked to continued participation in the monetary agreement. For example, to the extent that the future costs of reneging on a trade agreement (retaliatory tariffs) are weighted more heavily than the future costs of reneging on a monetary agreement (increased borrowing costs and higher inflation expectations), compliance will be improved. A group of states participating in several parallel agreements may include a hegemonic power, but this is not a necessary condition for parallel agreements to impose a constraint. Nor is it necessary for a government to join a monetary union with the specific intention of establishing credibility. The implication of the argument here is that as long as a government seeks to preserve parallel agreements with other states, it will face higher costs of exit from a monetary union, regardless of the reasons it joined the union in the first place.
Similar arguments have been made with regard to enforcement of collusive agreements among oligopolists who have contact in multiple markets. 17 In an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma in a single market, collusion can be enforced if firms adopt trigger strategies against potential defections. When there is multimarket contact, defection of any sort is likely to be met with punishment in both markets. Anticipating this outcome, if firms defect they will do so in both markets. Multimarket contact will not always change bargaining outcomes, however, because benefits and costs of cheating may rise in similar proportion.
One contribution of Bernheim and Whinston is to show that if a firm attaches more weight to future outcomes in one market than another, then multimarket contact can lead to a different bargaining outcome. It does so by allowing collusion to occur in cases where firms discount the future too heavily for collusion to be an equilibrium in a single market. Multimarket contact can also lead to improved enforcement of collusion in a market where punishment strategies are less feasible if this market is linked to another where punishment strategies are more feasible. This may be particularly relevant to the case of monetary unions where it is difficult to retaliate against defectors, unlike the case of trade co-operation where retaliatory tariffs can be applied.
There are two caveats to make with regard to the above discussion. First, as in pure reputational models and in models where reputational costs of reneging are increased by adoption of an exchange rate peg, there are multiple equilibria in Bernheim and Whinston's multimarket model. The only prediction possible is that multimarket contact makes credible commitment more likely, and for a broader range of discount factors. Secondly, while parallel international agreements can raise the cost of exit from a monetary union, in order for a union to provide credibility it is still necessary that states make efforts to place sanctions on members who seek to break the rules of a monetary union without exiting. 18 The above discussion can be distilled into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Exit from a monetary union is less probable in cases where a government participates in parallel international agreements which it wishes to preserve. 17 Bernheim and Whinston, 'Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior'. 18 A third issue is that of renegotiation. While in Bernheim and Whinston's model, exit from one of two parallel agreements should never occur in equilibrium, if it did happen, then in some cases it might be Pareto-optimal for countries to renegotiate so as to preserve co-operation in the one remaining area. Of course, renegotiation problems also exist in single markets, but the problem would seem even more complex in a multimarket setting. Unfortunately, this 'renegotiation problem' has been explored neither by Bernheim and Whinston nor in subsequent articles on multimarket contact. What is more, the game-theoretic literature on renegotiation has as yet to settle on a consensus definition of renegotiation-proof equilibria in infinitely repeated games. As a consequence, we leave this issue for future research.
The most appropriate test of the above hypothesis can be achieved by using both quantitative evidence and a qualitative evaluation. For our sample of African countries which participated in monetary unions at independence a statistical test can be used to estimate whether the presence of parallel agreements was associated with countries that did not exit. This test also helps to control for alternative explanations for the evolution of these unions, including economic efficiency concerns, political instability and colonial heritage. In addition to the fact that the experience of these states forms a natural experiment, the fact that African states have numerous similarities in other dimensions helps control for the heterogeneity which would otherwise be present in a larger sample of countries.
A qualitative evaluation is also crucial if we are to provide a full test of our hypothesis. While our statistical test can establish whether parallel agreements existed, only a qualitative analysis can establish whether and when governments actively sought to preserve these parallel agreements.
A C R O S S -C O U N T R Y T E S T O F T H E P A R A L L E L A G R E E M E N T H Y P O T H E S I S
As noted above, there exists a particularly interesting set of cases with which one can test the hypothesis that costs of exit from a monetary union are increased by the presence of parallel agreements. Table 1 19 Each of the above agreements had several common features: including a fixed exchange rate with free convertibility and very strict limits on central bank lending to government. In a number of ways, in fact, these African monetary institutions resembled the currency board arrangements which have emerged in a number of countries during the 1990s. Under both the African monetary unions of the 1960s and the contemporary currency boards, governments have lost control over monetary policy unless they decide to dismantle the monetary institution itself.
In addition to listing membership in African monetary unions, Table 1 also documents the extent of parallel agreements with other member states in the areas of trade, aid and security. 20 Parallel agreements were initially present in 19 The Franc Zone countries are divided according to its two constituent unions: the West African Monetary Union and the Central African Monetary Area. Madagascar was a member of the Franc Zone but was not a member of either of these two sub-unions, and so it is listed separately. 20 Since Great Britain was not a member of any of the unions among its former colonies, we do not list parallel agreements it might have had with African states. See the later discussion of the EACB for more detail on this issue. Information on currency unions other than the two Franc Zone unions and the East African Currency Board (which are discussed in detail in later sections) is drawn from the following: J. B. 
Specification and Data for Statistical Testing
In our cross-country test we estimate the likelihood of exit from a monetary agreement as a function of three factors: (1) the presence of parallel international agreements, (2) economic efficiency considerations, and (3) the degree of political instability. 22 This first factor allows us to test our own hypothesis while the second and third allow us to test alternative hypotheses for the durability of a monetary union. 23 The data we use cover each of the countries presented in Table 1 and are divided into two periods: 1960-72 (Bretton Woods) and 1973-94 (post-Bretton Woods). 24 We use three variables to measure the presence of parallel international agreements between members of a monetary union. CUSTOMS is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in cases where there is a customs union between members of a monetary union. The variable MILITARY is coded 1 if a country has a mutual defence treaty with other union members; it is coded 2 if other member states have military bases on its territory, and it is otherwise coded 0. 25 The variable AID measures the quantity of development assistance (as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)) which a country receives from other member states of a union. For each of these three variables, in cases where a country exits from a union, the variables are coded according to the status of parallel arrangements at the time of exit. For example, if a country participates (F'note continued) and Swaziland', in J. S. Salkin et al., eds, Aspects of the Botswana Economy: Selected Papers (London: James Currey, 1997); IMF, Surveys of African Economies, various years. 21 In both unions where customs unions were present there was also a system of fiscal redistribution from the richest state in each grouping (Kenya in the EACB, South Africa for the RMA) to poorer states. 22 The dependent variable EXIT is coded based on the information in Table 1 , although Rhodesia and Kenya are both coded as having a value of 0 for EXIT, since they were obliged to end participation in their monetary unions after all other members left. 23 There are several other factors we do not consider. Based on the earlier discussion the presence of multiple veto players in a country's political system is another potential factor one should test, but African governments during the period we consider have overwhelmingly had political institutions which do not provide for multiple veto players. Undoubtedly, intellectual trends were also a contributing factor in the abandonment of currency unions by some countries. 24 Countries which exited from a monetary union in period 1 are not included in period 2. 25 The logic behind this coding is that presence of a military base represents more of a commitment in the area of defence than does a mutual assistance treaty. in a currency union and also has a defence treaty with other union members, but it then nullifies its defence treaty at the same time as exiting from the union, then MILITARY takes the value of 0 for that period. This coding scheme is designed accurately to test the observable implications of our hypothesis, which states that in cases where countries participate in a currency union as well as a parallel agreement, we should expect them to exit either from both or from neither. In addition to testing our hypothesis about parallel agreements, we also wish to test potential alternative hypotheses to our own. The literature on optimal currency areas suggests that it will be economically efficient for a country to participate in a currency area when it trades intensively with other members (thus increasing the transactions costs benefits of monetary union) and when the output shocks to which a country is subject are highly correlated with those of other member states. 26 We construct a variable TRADE which represents the ratio between a country's trade with members of its currency union and its overall external trade. A second variable, SHOCKS, measures the extent to which output shocks in a given country are correlated with output shocks experienced by its partners. 27 An economic efficiency hypothesis would predict that TRADE and SHOCKS should be negatively correlated with the likelihood of exit from monetary arrangements.
As mentioned above, while it is difficult to establish testable hypotheses regarding reputation and the cost of exit, one feature common to all reputational models is that reputational equilibria are only possible when a government does not discount the future too heavily. One determinant of a government's discount factor is the perceived probability of being thrown out of office. The literature on determinants of exchange rate regime choice has operationalized this by predicting that governments in countries with histories of political instability will be more likely to renege on exchange rate pegs. 28 We proxy for political instability using four variables from the Banks dataset: the frequency of strikes, riots, coups and political assassinations in each country. 29 We expect the coefficients for each of these variables to be positive. In cases where countries do not exit, the value for each instability variable represents the average frequency over each period. In cases where countries do exit, we code the instability variables as the average frequency during the five years preceding the decision to exit. Note: White's heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels. Table 2 presents the results from our logit estimations of the likelihood of exit. In Equation 1 the probability of exit is modelled exclusively as a function of parallel international agreements. The coefficients on MILITARY and CUSTOMS have the expected sign and are highly significant while the coefficient on AID has the expected sign and is significant at the 10 per cent level.
Estimation Results
Equation 2 expands the model to include our variables for economic efficiency considerations and political instability. In this specification the coefficients on all three variables for parallel agreements retain their expected signs and levels of significance remain similar to those in Equation 1. Results for the economic efficiency variables are mixed. The coefficient on TRADE is negative as the efficiency hypothesis would predict, but it is not significant. The reverse is true for the coefficient on SHOCKS. The coefficients on the instability variables are either not significant at conventional levels, or they are significant but not of the expected sign (in the case of RIOTS).
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In order to test each of our hypotheses against the null hypothesis, we report p-values from likelihood ratio tests of the joint significance of each of our three groups of variables. In Equation 2, while we massively reject the null hypothesis that the parallel agreement variables are jointly zero, in the case of the instability variables we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero. We cannot reject the null hypothesis in the case of the economic efficiency variables either.
As
shape the different evolution of monetary arrangements in their former African colonies, these results suggest that there remains significant variation within each of these two groups of countries which cannot be explained by a simple distinction between former colonial powers.
31
All of the results in Table 2 are robust to exclusion of outliers.
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In addition to being statistically significant, our results in Table 2 are also substantively significant. We can estimate predicted probabilities of exit from a monetary union, based on a technique recently developed by King, Tomz and Wittenberg which creates a simulated set of regression coefficients based on 1,000 draws from the sampling distribution for each coefficient derived from our logit model. 33 We can then calculate the simulated effect of changes in our 30 We considered the possibility that these results for the instability variables might be attributable to high collinearity. In fact, this seems very unlikely to be the case, because the highest simple correlation between two of our instability variables is only 0.37. 31 One reason the dummy variable FRANCE might not be significant is due to its collinearity with the variables ODA and MILITARY. Only former French colonies have had parallel agreements in the areas of aid and security co-operation, but since neither of these variables is a 0-1 variable, the correlation is not as high as one might think. The adjusted R 2 of a bivariate regression of FRANCE on MILITARY is only 0.39. 32 Based on the Delta-Beta influence statistic developed by Pregibon and appropriate for logit models, there are two significant outliers in our sample: Mauritania during period 2 and Guinea during period 1 (D. Pregibon, 'Logistic Regression Analysis', Annals of Statistics, 9 (1981), 705-24). A logit model of regression 2 was re-estimated with these observations excluded. Likelihood ratio tests for the joint significance of coefficients provided results similar to the original regressions. We could reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on our parallel agreements variables were zero, while we could not reject the null hypothesis for coefficients on both the political instability and economic efficiency variables. 33 Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg, 'Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation' (paper presented to the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1998). independent variables on the likelihood of exit. Adopting a customs agreement is estimated to reduce probability of exit by 24 per cent, while adopting a military agreement would reduce the same probability by 41 per cent, and results with regard to aid agreements are similar. 34 While the above results are clearly consistent with the parallel agreements hypothesis and inconsistent with the economic efficiency hypothesis, the results with regard to political instability are more ambiguous. One possibility is that the failure to find a statistically significant effect of instability on the likelihood of exit from a currency union may be due to mis-specification. Reputational models predict that below a certain discount factor, reputational equilibria are impossible. They do not necessarily imply a linear relationship between the discount factor and the likelihood that a reputational equilibrium will be established. It may be that the reputational hypothesis should be tested by looking for a critical level of political instability above which credible commitment does not occur. Statistics on political instability for individual countries in our sample show, however, that states which exited unions were no more unstable than states which remained.
35 Given this fact, another possible interpretation of our results for political instability is that parallel agreements bring sufficient benefits that even governments with very short time horizons which would prefer to renege on monetary rules have not found it in their interest to do so.
D U R A B I L I T Y O F T H E E A S T -A F R I C A N C U R R E N C Y B O A R D

Methodology for Qualitative Evidence
Our cross-country test provides support for the parallel agreements hypothesis, but it does not allow us to test all of the observable implications of our argument. A qualitative analysis of several monetary unions can allow us to answer several other questions, such as whether decision makers in countries did actually perceive that negotiations in different issue areas were linked. We focus on the CFA Franc Zone and the East African Currency Board, because there has been substantial variation in outcomes between these two unions as well as within each of the two unions, which should aid in evaluating our hypothesis. 34 The confidence intervals for these predictions are quite sizeable, however, as the 95 per cent interval for a customs agreement ranges of Ϫ 64 per cent to ϩ 1 per cent, while the same interval for a military agreement ranges from Ϫ 81 per cent to Ϫ 3 per cent. The imprecision in these estimates is undoubtedly influenced by small sample size. Following the formula for predicted probabilities used by King, Tomz and Wittenberg these confidence intervals reflect estimation uncertainty, but they average out the effect of uncertainty due to the stochastic component of our estimation. 35 Mean values for each of our political instability variables are not significantly different when comparing the EXIT ϭ 1 and EXIT ϭ 0 sub-samples. None of the states which exited had notably high levels of instability according to these measures. 36 The implication would be that none of the countries in our sample were sufficiently unstable for the government to have a discount factor so low that even the presence of parallel agreements would not allow credible commitment.
For each union we first document the monetary rules in place and show how they evolved over time. We do not consider directly whether leaders sought to remain in the union to gain policy credibility, because our theoretical discussion suggests that the presence of parallel agreements is likely to increase costs of exit from a union regardless of the reason one initially joined.
Our review of rules and their evolution is followed by a presentation of evidence on the subsequent degree of adherence to rules. We also use primary and secondary source evidence to document pressures in individual states to renege on monetary rules. The case for our hypothesis will be strengthened if it can be shown that there were periods when some governments would have preferred to renege on the rules of their monetary union, but they chose not to exit.
The next step is to consider whether parallel international agreements raised costs of exit for states. This involves asking whether a government participated in agreements with other member states in the areas of trade, aid or security, and whether in cases of exit it sought to also terminate these other agreements. Alternatively, in cases where there is evidence of pressures on rules, but a government did not renege, we examine whether it actively sought to preserve parallel agreements. Finally, in order for parallel agreements to serve as a constraint on a government reneging on a monetary accord, we predict that other member governments must actively oppose attempts to renege on monetary rules.
Design of Monetary Rules
From 1960 until 1966 the East African Currency Board was the monetary authority of a currency union composed of the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (later Tanzania) . 37 The EACB exchanged East African shillings for British sterling without restriction at a fixed rate, and it was subject to strict limits on its lending to commercial banks and to territorial governments. 38 In terms of governance structure, six of the seven seats on the EACB board were given to representatives from the three African member territories. 39 As a result, 37 Somaliland and Aden were also members of the EACB, but the former withdrew before independence so it is not considered here, and the latter also announced its intention of withdrawing at this time (since it remained a British colony). 38 Several increases were applied to these limits after 1960 as part of efforts to transform the EACB from a pure currency board into a central bank. Overall lending facilities for governments were set at £20 million in 1961 (equivalent to 33 per cent of currency in circulation) and subsequently raised several times, reaching £35 million in December 1964 (equivalent to 44 per cent of currency in circulation). In terms of revenue, the borrowing limits in 1964 represented 32 per cent of Kenyan revenues and 29 per cent of Tanzanian and Ugandan revenues. While this was a significant sum, for a government near its ceiling due to previous borrowing it became a binding constraint. Lending to commercial banks for crop financing was initially set at £5 million in 1960 and subsequently raised to £10 million in December 1962 (equivalent to 15 per cent of total currency in circulation at the time). East African Currency Board, 'Annual Report' (Nairobi, various years); Joachim Kratz, 'The East African Currency Board', IMF Staff Papers, 13 (1966), 229-55. 39 From this point on, the only member of the British administration on the EACB was a technical adviser from the Bank of England.
it would be incorrect to see the eventual decision by several East African states to leave the EACB as due to the fact that it was a British-led institution The British government was in fact attempting to withdraw from official involvement with the EACB during this period. 40 There is no written record of voting rules on the EACB board but, in practice, the Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian representatives each held a veto over key monetary policy decisions, including those to raise or lower limits on lending to governments (see below). In 1966 the East African Currency Board was disbanded, in a decision precipitated by the Tanzanian government and to a lesser extent, the Ugandan government. The collapse of the East African Currency Board was accompanied by the dismantling of parallel agreements between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Pressures on Monetary Rules
There is strong evidence that political pressures for increased spending in Tanzania and Uganda would have led to greatly increased monetary financing of fiscal deficits between 1960 and 1966 were it not for the fact that their participation in the EACB restricted this possibility. This leaves us with a puzzle of explaining why Tanzania and Uganda remained in the EACB until 1966. The Kenyan government borrowed relatively little from the EACB, and it pursued a prudent macroeconomic policy throughout the two periods, as evidenced by its inflation and fiscal policy performance (Table 3) . As a result, we do not consider the issue of to what degree monetary rules were a constraint on Kenya.
From 1960 to 1966 the EACB rule on lending to governments was consistently adhered to, and it was made difficult to modify by Kenyan vetoes of demands for excess increases in EACB fiduciary limits. The fixed exchange rate with free convertibility to British sterling was also fully respected. Tanzania's government made numerous requests to increase EACB limits on lending to governments in order to obtain finance necessary to fund its capital expenditures after foreign sources of funding fell well short of original estimates. 41 The socialist economic programme advocated by President Nyerere was centred upon an increased role for state-owned enterprises in the economy and involved substantial increases of government expenditures for this purpose. 42 In a number of cases where the EACB was not forthcoming with additional finance, Tanzania was forced to scale back investments. 43 As seen in Table 3 , from the end of 1962 on, the Tanzanian government found itself frequently at or near its limit for borrowing from the EACB. On occasions, periodic increases in the limit provided further breathing room. 44 The Kenyan government steadfastly opposed attempts to make excessive hikes in the limit above those which were seen as prudent for maintaining price stability. 45 The Ugandan government also found itself in periodic borrowing difficulties with the EACB. As early as 1963, documents show that Ugandan representatives were complaining about the 'uncompromising' attitude of the EACB. 46 In Uganda fiscal pressures came as much from demands for increased current spending as for development spending. Unable to attract aid and investment flows as sizeable as those going to Kenya, Uganda financed these increased expenditures through greater borrowing from the EACB and by running down other foreign assets.
47 Table 3 shows that Uganda also found itself at its EACB borrowing limit from 1964. Table 4 presents more general data on economic performance in East Africa, with a clear deterioration observable for Uganda and Tanzania following the break-up of the EACB in 1966.
Parallel Agreements and the Cost of Exit from the EACB
Evidence from Tanzania and Uganda strongly supports the parallel agreement hypothesis regarding the costs of exit from a monetary union. From 1960 to 1966, for two governments with a preference for relaxing monetary rules so as to allow increased monetary financing of government spending, fear of forgoing the future benefits of parallel international agreements with Kenya deterred them from exiting from the EACB. When it became clear that these future benefits would not be as large as originally anticipated, both states exited.
In addition to their common currency, at independence the three East African countries also shared a common market, combined with high tariffs on industrial imports from third countries, and a series of common administrative services. While the Kenyan government benefited from this situation to the extent that most industry in East Africa was located on its territory, Tanzania and Uganda benefited from fiscal redistribution, because Kenya funded a disproportionate share of East Africa's common services. 48 The Tanzanian government hoped to preserve these regional agreements with Uganda and Kenya while modifying 44 As noted above, these increases had been planned as part of gradual reforms whereby the EACB would begin to operate more like a central bank. 45 The best direct evidence on the attitude taken by the Kenyan government is from 1964 and 1965 (de Loynes papers, OV7/63 609/5, OV7/64 610/1). The Kenyan government also apparently opposed a Tanzanian initiative in April 1964 to establish exchange controls between the East African shilling and the British pound (de Loynes papers, 22 April 1964, Bank of England Archive, OV7/85 615/3). 46 De Loynes papers, 14 May 1963, OV7/61 609/3. 47 IMF, Surveys of African Economies, 1969. 48 Each country retained half of its tax revenues and added the other half to a revenue pool meant to fund the common services. Since Kenya collected substantially higher revenues than the other two states relative to the size of its population, this amounted to a significant element of redistribution. them to establish a system of managed trade whereby certain industries would be reserved for each country. Both the Tanzanian government and Uganda's prime minister also hoped to derive benefits from a planned political federation with Kenya which could allow for increased Kenyan financial subsidies for its two poorer neighbours. 49 One proposition was for Kenya to make transfers to Tanzania and Uganda through a regional development bank.
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By 1964, according to one observer 'it had become clear that a federation was, to say the least, not imminent', as the three East African governments were unable to agree on the structure of federal institutions. 51 The Kenyan government did eventually agree to a plan instituting quotas on intra-community trade in certain products and allocating certain industries to each country, but only on the proviso that in exchange, Tanzania would formally agree to preserve a common currency and the rest of the common market. 52 This demand is powerful evidence that the issues of monetary co-operation and other forms of co-operation were seen as being linked.
Dissatisfied with the Kenyan concessions, the Tanzanian government did not agree to this demand, and from the late spring of 1964 there were rumours of its making a unilateral initiative to set up a separate currency. 53 In February 1965 the Ugandan government also changed its position, as it made a unilateral decision that it would create its own state bank which effectively spelled the end of the common currency. When the break up of the EACB was first announced in June 1965, the Tanzanian minister of finance made it clear in his public address that failure to move towards a political federation had been the precipitating event, because political federation and continued EACB participation were inextricably linked. 54 Tanzania also took unilateral steps at this time to impose restrictions on a wide range of imports from Kenya. 55 Uganda soon followed suit.
These developments are consistent with our earlier prediction that, when there are two or more parallel agreements, states will either renege on both agreements or on neither. Under pressures to escape the constraints posed by monetary rules, the East African Currency Board survived only as long as there was a sentiment on the part of rulers in Uganda and in Tanzania that future benefits of co-operation in other areas outweighed the short-term gains from reneging. While the Kenyan government consistently blocked attempts at excess monetary expansion within the EACB, ultimately it was unwilling to provide the benefits through parallel agreements which Tanzania, and to a lesser extent Uganda, were demanding in exchange for a promise not to exit the EACB.
D U R A B I L I T Y O F T H E C F A F R A N C Z O N E
Design of Monetary Rules
The CFA Franc Zone is divided into two unions: the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), for which the BCEAO is the central bank, and a Central African Monetary Area (CAMA), for which the BEAC is the monetary authority. The evolution of monetary rules in the Franc Zone can be broken down into two periods: 1960-72, when limits on central bank lending to government were extremely tight; and 1973-94, when monetary rules were modified but still had the potential to pose a constraint on member governments. Throughout both periods a fixed peg to the French franc was maintained with full convertibility. 56 In terms of limits on lending to government, between 1960 and 1973 both Franc Zone unions had some facilities for direct lending to governments, but the limits on this lending were strict. 57 In addition to rules limiting central bank financing of governments, both Franc Zone unions have also had statutory minimum levels of foreign reserve holdings. One key difference between the Franc Zone and the East African Currency Board is that convertibility for the CFA francs has been assured through a guarantee by the French Treasury. The counterpart to the convertibility guarantee has been that French government officials participate in the formulation of monetary policy within each of the Franc Zone's two monetary unions in order to see that the guarantee does not become a source of moral hazard. 
Pressures to Renege on Monetary Rules
During both the 1960-72 period and the 1973-94 period there were pressures from a number of CFA governments to change or ignore rules limiting central bank financing of government deficits. These pressures led to the exit of three states: Mali in 1962 (only to re-enter in 1968), Mauritania in 1973, and Madagascar in 1973. Guinea also left the Franc Zone (in 1958), but under different circumstances, as will be discussed below. The difference between the two periods was that during the 1960s pressures to renege on rules generally originated in the poorer, inland states of the Franc Zone. After 1973 these pressures were strongest in the two largest states of the CFA Zone: Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon.
During the 1960-73 period, all but three Franc Zone states chose to remain in their respective monetary union, and monetary rules were scrupulously respected despite evidence of political pressures in several states for increased monetary financing of development projects. 59 BCEAO's foreign reserve coverage ratio during this period remained significantly higher than the 20 per cent minimum stipulated by statute. The BEAC pursued similar policies, and in both unions data on inflation, fiscal deficits and changes in net claims of the banking sector on government reflect this performance (Table 5) . 60 Several CFA leaders criticized the CFA agreements during the 1960s, and chief among their criticisms was the belief that there needed to be significantly increased central bank finance for development projects (both public and private). Mali engaged in a lengthy dispute with the BCEAO over credits to public enterprises that would eventually lead to its exit in 1962. Senegal's prime minister pushed for establishment of monetary agreements which would allow greater independence for individual governments. By the early 1970s, leaders in Mauritania and Madagascar had also called for greater monetary autonomy, and they would eventually choose to exit the Franc Zone in order to achieve this goal. 61 Leaders in a number of states which did not ultimately exit, such as Benin, Togo and Niger, also called for a relaxation of monetary rules. 62 The French authorities took a dim view of the idea of significantly raising borrowing ceilings. 63 France played the same role of vetoing proposed rule changes that was played by Kenya in the East African Currency Board. As a result, between 1960 and 1973 other states were faced with the choice of either exiting or remaining in their union and continuing to adhere to the rules. Unlike the initial post-independence period, the years between 1973 and 1994 were characterized by large negative terms of trade shocks in the CFA Zone. Heavy reliance by CFA governments on taxes on international trade for revenue, combined with an inability to reduce the public sector wage bill (the main component of expenditures) led to increased fiscal deficits in many states, and in the two largest CFA states in particular (Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon). This created pressures to violate monetary rules. While inflation performance of the Franc Zone countries after 1973 continued to be strong, it became increasingly difficult to argue that participation in the unions served as a constraint on member governments, as monetary rules were broken and a failure to restrain central bank credit resulted in increased balance of payments deficits. There were several major direct violations of the rule limiting central bank borrowing to 20 per cent of revenues. The rule establishing minimum foreign reserve levels of 20 per cent of sight liabilities should also have limited the expansion of both direct and indirect credit to governments. Figures on net claims of the banking sector on government (Table 5) show a significant increase during this period in both unions, and most notably in Côte d'Ivoire.
In sum, evidence on pressures to renege on CFA monetary rules during the periods 1960-73 and 1973-94 raises two questions: what determined whether states which had pressed for a relaxation in monetary rules would decide to exit their union, and why were certain states able to renege on rules without exiting during the 1980s and early 1990s?
Parallel Agreements and the Cost of Exit from the CFA Zone
Evidence on the costs of reneging on CFA rules during the first thirteen years of independence is consistent with our earlier hypothesis. Because exiting the CFA Zone ultimately involved terminating other forms of co-operation with France, this had a major deterrent effect. It was also crucial that France at this time opposed attempts by other states to violate or change rules without exiting. In each of the three cases of departure from the CFA Zone between 1960 and 1973, there is evidence that, as our hypothesis would predict, governments also sought to terminate other types of co-operation with France. No such actions were taken by leaders of CFA governments which had publicly criticized the monetary agreements but which did not ultimately exit. Co-operation with France was thought of as a package which needed to be either accepted or rejected as a whole.
For heads of CFA governments there was a significant cost to leaving the Franc Zone in that this would be likely to result in the termination by France of other forms of co-operation, the two most important of which were bilateral aid and military support. France has been the largest bilateral donor to CFA governments, and it has also been able to exercise considerable influence in ensuring the continuity of World Bank and IMF funding to CFA states. 64 In terms of military aid, all CFA states except for Mali, Cameroon and Burkina Faso signed defence assistance accords with France which provided insurance against both external and internal threats. French guarantees of military support proved especially valuable to a number of Francophone African leaders. 65 Madagascar was one of the three CFA states which chose to terminate both monetary co-operation and parallel agreements with France. In Madagascar, the French government had remained a staunch supporter of President Philibert Tsiranana up to his resignation in 1972. The military government which succeeded him made moves to develop a different support base among the island's growing nationalist movement. Madagascar's exit from the Franc Zone in 1973 occurred at the same time that the Malagasy government negotiated a French withdrawal from military bases on the island. 66 The number of French technical assistants in Madagascar was also dramatically reduced. 67 In 1962 the Malian government decided to create its own currency after a series of disputes with the BCEAO over requests for extensions of credit to government and public enterprises. 68 Underlying this dispute over lending was the fact that the French colonial administration had given strong support to an opposition party. 69 As noted above, Mali was one of the few states which had refused to sign a defence accord with France. The Malian government made a number of moves to establish close diplomatic and aid relations with Soviet bloc governments, and its decision to leave the Franc Zone was accompanied by the Malian government's attempt to reduce its aid dependence on France. Mali's reintegration into the Franc Zone in 1967-68 was an explicit quid pro quo which the French government demanded in exchange for a resumption of French financial aid. 70 Mauritania's exit from the Franc Zone in 1973 also occurred as part of a broader political break with France. In the early 1970s a growing nationalist movement in this predominantly Arabic-speaking country prompted a change of diplomatic orientation, as Mauritania's ruling party called for the government to 'search constantly for a truer independence in all domains'. 71 The government subsequently terminated its existing aid and military relations with France and negotiated accords with Morocco and Algeria which had previously not accorded Mauritania diplomatic recognition. 72 Exit from the Franc Zone occurred during this transition. 73 The final case of exit from the Franc Zone to consider is that of Guinea (in 1958) which departed under different circumstances than those in which Mali, Mauritania and Madagascar left. Following Guinea's declaration of political independence in 1958, to the surprise of Guinean leaders, the French government cancelled all forms of co-operation with Guinea, including Guinea's right to participate in the Franc Zone. The Guinean case seems best characterized as an example of miscalculation about the extent of linkages between different forms of co-operation with France.
In 1960-73 a number of leaders in CFA states voiced their desire to exit monetary agreements which they thought excessively conservative, but during the subsequent period (1973-94) governments no longer discussed exiting, seeking instead above all to ensure the continuity of France's guarantee for the CFA franc's rate of parity with the French franc. This raises the question of why states were able to break the rules concerning central bank lending to governments and levels of foreign reserves.
The most important factor here is that the French government for a number of years made little effort to oppose these violations. We do not consider the determinants of French policy in detail in this article, but the fact that France chose to enforce monetary rules during one period while subsequently ignoring them raises the question of why there should be such a dramatic change in policy. One key reason is that the unprecedented magnitude of the terms of trade shock suffered by many CFA states after 1985 prompted many French officials to fear widespread instability in both CFA unions. This was a very different situation 73 Mauritania also nationalized its principal copper mining company which had been under French ownership. Mauritania broke with France in 1973 but re-established many links several years later, after a dramatic fall in the world price for iron ore and developments in the Western Sahara conflict (Nouaille-Degorce, 'La Politique française de coopération').
from the 1960s when commodity prices had mostly been stable. 74 Another important factor was that while attempts to renege on CFA monetary rules during the 1960s came mainly from smaller and poorer states such as Mali, during the 1980s much more influential states like Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire sought to break the rules. It has been argued that French policy was controlled by a group of individuals who had strong private reasons for preserving short-term political stability for key CFA governments and for Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon in particular. 75 As a consequence, there was a conflict between France's goal in terms of monetary co-operation (avoiding a situation where it would have to exercise its guarantee of the CFA franc's convertibility) and its goals in terms of aid and security co-operation (providing political stability for certain CFA governments).
C O N C L U S I O N
While previous work has argued that the presence of parallel agreements may reinforce monetary co-operation in Europe, in this article we have asked a broader set of questions. In particular, can a general hypothesis be developed about parallel issues and the credibility of monetary commitments? We have also tested the parallel agreements hypothesis using a set of cases which provide a natural experiment for investigating the credibility of monetary commitments. Results suggest that international monetary agreements are in fact more durable when parallel agreements are present. They also show that monetary unions will only improve credibility when other member states veto attempts to renege on monetary rules. In some cases, the concerns raised by parallel international agreements may actually lead other member states not to oppose a government's efforts to transgress policy rules. Future research might develop falsifiable hypotheses about this conflict between objectives in different issue areas.
